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Growth  in this  model  is driven  by technological  change  that arises 
from  intentional  investment  decisions  made  by  profit-maximizing 
agents.  The  distinguishing  feature  of  the technology  as an input  is 
that it is neither  a conventional  good  nor a public good;  it is a non- 
rival,  partially  excludable  good.  Because  of  the  nonconvexity  in- 
troduced  by  a  nonrival  good,  price-taking  competition  cannot  be 
supported.  Instead,  the equilibrium  is one with monopolistic  compe- 
tition.  The  main  conclusions  are  that  the  stock  of  human  capital 
determines  the  rate  of  growth,  that too  little  human  capital is de- 
voted to research in equilibrium,  that integration into world markets 
will increase  growth  rates, and that having a large population  is not 
sufficient  to generate  growth. 
I.  Introduction 
Output  per  hour  worked  in  the  United  States  today  is  10  times  as 
valuable  as output  per  hour  worked  100  years  ago  (Maddison  1982). 
In  the  1950s,  economists  attributed  almost  all  the  change  in  output 
per  hour  worked  to  technological  change  (Abramovitz  1956;  Ken- 
drick  1956;  Solow  1957).  Subsequent  analysis  raised  our  estimates  of 
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the importance  of increases in the effective  labor force and the effec- 
tive stock of capital in generating  growth in output  per worker (Jor- 
genson,  Gollop,  and  Fraumeni  1987),  but  technological  change  has 
surely been important  as well. The  raw materials that we use have not 
changed,  but as a result  of  trial and  error,  experimentation,  refine- 
ment,  and  scientific  investigation,  the instructions  that we follow  for 
combining  raw materials have become  vastly more sophisticated.  One 
hundred  years ago, all we could do to get visual stimulation from iron 
oxide  was to use it as a pigment.  Now we put it on plastic tape and use 
it to make videocassette  recordings. 
The  argument  presented  in this paper is based on three  premises. 
The  first is that technological  change-improvement  in the instruc- 
tions for mixing together  raw materials-lies  at the heart of economic 
growth.  As a result,  the  model  presented  here  resembles  the  Solow 
(1956)  model  with technological  change.  Technological  change  pro- 
vides the incentive  for continued  capital accumulation,  and together, 
capital accumulation  and  technological  change  account  for  much  of 
the increase  in output  per hour  worked. 
The  second  premise is that technological  change arises in large part 
because of intentional  actions taken by people  who respond  to market 
incentives.  Thus  the model  is one  of endogenous  rather than exoge- 
nous  technological  change.  This  does  not  mean  that everyone  who 
contributes  to technological  change is motivated by market incentives. 
An academic scientist who is supported  by government  grants may be 
totally insulated  from  them.  The  premise  here  is that market incen- 
tives  nonetheless  play an essential  role  in  the  process  whereby  new 
knowledge  is translated  into  goods  with  practical value.  Our  initial 
understanding  of  electromagnetism  arose  from  research  conducted 
in  academic  institutions,  but  magnetic  tape  and  home  videocassette 
recorders  resulted  from  attempts  by private firms to earn a profit. 
The  third  and  most  fundamental  premise  is that instructions  for 
working  with raw materials are inherently  different  from other  eco- 
nomic  goods.  Once  the cost of  creating  a new set of instructions  has 
been incurred,  the instructions  can be used over and over again at no 
additional  cost. Developing  new and better instructions  is equivalent 
to  incurring  a fixed  cost.  This  property  is taken  to be the  defining 
characteristic of  technology. 
Most  models  of  aggregate  growth,  even  those  with  spillovers  or 
external  effects,  rely on  price-taking  behavior.  But once  these  three 
premises  are granted,  it follows directly that an equilibrium with price 
taking cannot be supported.  Section II of the paper starts by showing 
why this is so.  It also indicates  which  of  the  premises  is dropped  in 
growth  models  that do  depend  on  price-taking  behavior.  The  argu- 
ment  in this section  is fundamental  to the motivation  for the particu- TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  S73 
lar  model  of  monopolistic  competition  that  follows,  but  it is more 
general  than  the model  itself. 
In  the  specific  model  outlined  in  Section  III,  a firm incurs  fixed 
design  or research and development  costs when it creates a new good. 
It  recovers  those  costs  by  selling  the  new  good  for  a  price  that  is 
higher  than its constant  cost of  production.  Since there is free entry 
into  this activity, firms earn  zero profit in a present  value sense. 
The conclusions  of the model follow directly from this specification. 
On  the  basis of  results  from  the  static theory  of  trade  with  differ- 
entiated  goods  (see,  e.g.,  Helpman  and  Krugman  1985), one  should 
expect  that fixed  costs lead  to gains from  increases in the size of the 
market  and  therefore  to  gains  from  trade  between  different  coun- 
tries.  Perhaps  the  most  interesting  feature  of  the  equilibrium  cal- 
culated  for the model  constructed  here is that increases in the size of 
the  market  have effects  not only on  the level of income  and welfare 
but also on the rate of growth.  Larger markets induce  more research 
and faster  growth. 
The  analysis also suggests  why population  is not the right measure 
of  market  size and  why the  presence  of  a large  domestic  market in 
countries  such as China or India is not a substitute for trade with the 
rest of the world. The  growth rate is increasing in the stock of human 
capital, but it does  not depend  on the total size of the labor force or 
the  population.  In a limiting  case that may be relevant  for historical 
analysis and  for  the  poorest  countries  today,  if  the  stock of  human 
capital is too low, growth  may not take place at all. 
These  implications  of  the  model  are taken  up  briefly in the  final 
sections  of  the paper.  Section  III describes  the functional  forms that 
are  used  to  describe  the  preferences  and  the  technology  for  the 
model.  It  defines  an  equilibrium  that  allows  for  both  monopolistic 
competition  and  external  effects  arising  from  knowledge  spillovers. 
Section  IV  offers  a brief  intuitive  description  of  a balanced  growth 
equilibrium  for the model.  Section V formally characterizes the equi- 
librium.  Section  VI  describes  the  welfare  properties  of  the  equilib- 
rium.  Section  VII  discusses  the  connection  implied  by  the  model 
between  trade, research,  and growth.  Algebraic details of the deriva- 
tions are placed  in the  Appendix. 
II.  Rivalry,  Excludability,  and  Nonconvexities 
Economists  studying  public finance  have identified  two fundamental 
attributes  of  any economic  good:  the  degree  to which it is rivalrous 
and the  degree  to which it is excludable  (Cornes and Sandler  1986). 
Rivalry is a purely technological  attribute. A purely rival good  has the 
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other; a purely nonrival good  has the property that its use by one firm 
or person  in no way limits its use by another.  Excludability is a func- 
tion of both the technology  and the legal system. A good is excludable 
if the owner can prevent others from using it. A good such as the code 
for a computer  program  can be made excludable  by means of a legal 
system  that  prohibits  copying  or  by means  of  encryption  and  copy 
protection  schemes. 
Conventional  economic  goods  are both  rivalrous  and  excludable. 
They  are privately  provided  and  can be traded  in competitive  mar- 
kets.  By  definition,  public  goods  are both  nonrival  and  nonexclud- 
able.  Because  they are nonexcludable,  they cannot  be privately pro- 
vided  or  traded  in  markets.  Public goods  can  be  introduced  into  a 
model of price-taking behavior by assuming  the existence of a govern- 
ment  that can levy taxes.  Basic scientific research  is an example  of a 
public good  that could be provided  in this way and that is relevant for 
modeling  growth. 
Rivalry  and  excludability  are  closely  linked  because  most  rival 
goods  are excludable.  (A parking space in a shopping  center  parking 
lot is an example  of a good  that is effectively  nonexcludable  because 
the cost of enforcing  excludability  is too high  relative to the value of 
the good.)  The  interesting  case for growth  theory  is the set of goods 
that are nonrival  yet excludable.  The  third  premise  cited  in the  In- 
troduction  implies  that  technology  is a nonrival  input.  The  second 
premise  implies  that technological  change  takes place because of the 
actions of self-interested  individuals,  so improvements  in the technol- 
ogy  must  confer  benefits  that  are  at least  partially excludable.  The 
first premise therefore  implies that growth is driven fundamentally  by 
the accumulation  of  a partially excludable,  nonrival input. 
To  evaluate  these  claims,  it helps  to have  a specific case in mind. 
The  example  of a nonrival input used in what follows is a design for a 
new good.  The  vast majority of designs  result from the research and 
development  activities of  private,  profit-maximizing  firms. A design 
is, nonetheless,  nonrival.  Once  the design  is created, it can be used as 
often  as desired,  in as many  productive  activities as desired. 
In  this  sense,  a  design  differs  in  a  crucial  way  from  a  piece  of 
human  capital such  as the ability to add.  The  design  is nonrival but 
the  ability to add  is not.  The  difference  arises because  the ability to 
add is inherently  tied to a physical object (a human body) whereas the 
design  is not.'  The  ability to add is rivalrous because the person who 
' The original version of this paper used the terms "embodied" and "disembodied" to 
refer to the difference  between an intangible such as the ability to add, which is tied to a 
specific  person,  and  an  intangible  such  as a design,  which  is not.  This  choice  of  ter- 
minology  is  not  used  in  this  revision  because  embodiment  has  another  meaning  in 
growth  theory  and  because  the  notion  of  rivalry already  exists  in the  public finance 
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possesses  this  ability cannot  be  in more  than  one  place at the  same 
time;  nor  can  this  person  solve  many  problems  at once.  As  noted 
above,  rivalry leads  to a presumption  that human  capital is also ex- 
cludable.  Thus  human capital can be privately provided and traded in 
competitive  markets.  In contrast,  the design  is nonrival  because  it is 
independent  of  any physical object.  It can be copied  and  used  in as 
many different  activities as desired. 
Like any scientific concept,  nonrivalry is an idealization.  It is some- 
times observed  that a design  cannot  be a nonrival  good  because  it is 
itself tied to the physical piece of paper or the physical computer  disk 
on  which  it is stored.  What is unambiguously  true about a design  is 
that the  cost of  replicating  it with a drafter,  a photocopier,  or a disk 
drive is trivial compared  to the cost of creating  the design  in the first 
place.  This  is  not  true  of  the  ability  to  add.  Training  the  second 
person  to  add  is  as  costly  as  training  the  first.  For  simplicity,  the 
arguments  here  will treat designs  as idealized  goods  that are not tied 
to  any  physical  good  and  can  be  costlessly  replicated,  but  nothing 
hinges  on whether  this is literally true or merely close to being  true. 
Nonrivalry  has  two  important  implications  for  the  theory  of 
growth.  First, nonrival goods can be accumulated  without bound on a 
per capita basis, whereas a piece of human capital such as the ability to 
add cannot.  Each person  has only a finite number of years that can be 
spent  acquiring  skills. When  this person  dies,  the  skills are lost, but 
any nonrival good  that this person  produces-a  scientific law; a prin- 
ciple of mechanical,  electrical, or chemical engineering;  a mathemat- 
ical result; software; a patent; a mechanical drawing; or a blueprint- 
lives  on  after  the  person  is gone.  Second,  treating  knowledge  as a 
nonrival good  makes it possible to talk sensibly about knowledge  spill- 
overs,  that is, incomplete  excludability.  These  two features  of knowl- 
edge-unbounded  growth  and incomplete  appropriability-are  fea- 
tures that are generally  recognized  as being relevant for the theory of 
growth.  What thinking  about nonrivalry  shows is that these  features 
are inextricably  linked  to nonconvexities. 
If a nonrival  input  has productive  value,  then  output  cannot  be a 
constant-returns-to-scale  function  of all its inputs taken together.  The 
standard  replication  argument  used to justify  homogeneity  of degree 
one  does  not  apply  because  it is not  necessary  to replicate  nonrival 
inputs.  Suppose  that a firm can invest  10,000  hours  of  engineering 
time to produce  a design  for a 20-megabyte  hard disk drive for com- 
puters.  Suppose  that it can produce  a total-of 2 trillion megabytes of 
storage  per  year  (i.e.,  100,000  units  of  the  drive)  if  it builds  a $10 
million factory and hires  100 workers. If it merely replicates the rival 
inputs-the  factory  and  the  workers-it  can double  its output  to 4 
trillion  megabytes  of  storage  per year. 
Suppose  that  the  firm  could  have  invested  20,000  hours  of  en- S76  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
gineering  time  in  the  design  work  instead  of  10,000  hours  and,  by 
doing  so,  could  have  designed  a 30-megabyte  hard  disk drive  that 
could be manufactured  with the same factory and workers. When the 
firm doubles  all its inputs,  it uses a 20,000-hour  design,  two factories, 
and  200  workers  and  produces  6  trillion  megabytes  of  storage  per 
year, three  times the original  output. 
More  formally,  if  F(A,  X)  represents  a  production  process  that 
depends  on rival inputs X and nonrival inputs A, then by a replication 
argument,  it follows that F(A, XX) =  XF(A,  X). This  replication argu- 
ment  assumes  that X is an exhaustive  list of the rival inputs.  Because 
the focus  here  is on national  economies,  the argument  neglects  inte- 
ger problems  that may be relevant  for a small market that gets stuck 
between  n and  n  +  1 plants. The  fact that it may not be possible to 
actually  replicate  all the  inputs  in  the  list X has  no  bearing  on  this 
argument  about the  properties  of F(-). 
If  A  is  productive  as well,  it  follows  that F  cannot  be  a concave 
production  function  because  F(XA, XX) >  XF(A, X).  Because  of  the 
properties  of homogeneous  functions,  it also follows that a firm with 
these  kinds  of  production  possibilities  could  not  survive  as a price 
taker.  If  disk drives  sold  for  marginal  cost,  annual  revenue  for  the 
firm would just  equal interest  payments  on the capital and wage pay- 
ments  to workers.  More generally,  since F(A, X)  =  X - (aF/OX)(A,  X), 
it follows  that 
F(A, X) <  A -  V  (A, X)  +  X -  V 
(A, X). 
aA  ax 
If all inputs  were  paid their value marginal  product,  the firm would 
suffer  losses. 
This  point  has been  made  many  times before  (Schumpeter  1942; 
Arrow  1962b; Shell  1966,  1967,  1973; Nordhaus  1969; Wilson 1975). 
Previous  growth  models  have avoided  this difficulty  in various ways. 
Solow  (1956)  treats A as an exogenously  provided  public input  (i.e., 
an input that is both nonexcludable  and nonrival). Shell (1966,  1967) 
treats it as a public input that is provided  by the government.  In each 
case,  the  factor  A  receives  no  compensation,  and  every  individual 
firm  is assumed  to  be  free  to  exploit  the  entire  stock of  A.  These 
models are consistent  with the first premise, that technological  change 
drives growth,  and the third,  that the technology  is a nonrival good, 
but they are inconsistent  with the second premise. They both deny the 
role that private, maximizing  behavior plays in generating  technologi- 
cal change. 
In  an  attempt  to  make  the  evolution  of  A  responsive  to  market 
incentives,  Arrow  (1962a)  assumed  that an increase  in K necessarily 
leads to an equiproportionate  increase in knowledge  through  "learn- TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  S77 
ing  by doing,"  but  he  still treats knowledge  as a public good.  Lucas 
(1988)  assumed  in effect  that it is production  of human capital rather 
than  physical  capital  that  generates  this  nonrival,  nonexcludable 
good.  Both of these papers make the production  of a nonrival, nonex- 
cludable  good  an  unintentional  side  effect  of  the  production  of  a 
conventional  good. 
The  learning-by-doing  formulation  has the advantage that it makes 
the rate of accumulation  of nonrival knowledge  endogenous,  but it is 
unsatisfactory  because  it  takes  the  strict  proportionality  between 
knowledge  and  physical  capital  or  knowledge  and  education  as an 
unexplained  and exogenously  given feature of the technology.  It pre- 
serves the public-good  character of knowledge  assumed by Solow and 
Shell  but  makes  it a public  good  that is privately provided  as a side 
effect.  Like the other  public-good  formulations,  it rules out the possi- 
bility that firms make  intentional  investments  in research and devel- 
opment. 
This  formulation  has the  additional  difficulty  that it is not robust. 
The  nonrival  input  produced  through  learning  by doing  must  be 
completely  nonexcludable.  If it were  even  partially excludable,  Das- 
gupta  and  Stiglitz  (1988)  show  that  decentralized  equilibrium  with 
many firms would  not be sustainable. 
In a partial equilibrium  model  of  an industry  in which  firms face 
upward-sloping  cost curves, Shell (1973) proposed  a model with price 
taking  in  which  expenditure  on  research  was compensated  out  of 
quasi rents.  Griliches  (1979),  again  in an industry  setting,  made  this 
formulation  more  explicit.  He assumed  that the production  function 
takes the  form F(AN,  AE,  X),  where AE represents  an excludable  part 
of  the  benefits  of  research  and  development  and AN  represents  the 
nonexcludable  part.  Since  AE  is excludable,  it is accumulated  inten- 
tionally.  The  nonexcludable  part  AN  is  created  as  a  side  effect  of 
producing  AE.  He also assumed  that the function F(.) is homogeneous 
of degree  one  in X and AE  taken together. 
In an aggregate  model  of growth,  I made the same kind of assump- 
tion  (Romer  1986).  To  make the dynamic  analysis in this paper sim- 
ple,  I reduced  the  dynamic  model  to one  with a single-state-variable 
model  by assuming  that  the  excludable  good  AE  that the  firm  pro- 
duces  intentionally  is used  in fixed  proportions  with physical capital. 
As a result,  the  model  ends  up  having  dynamics  similar to those  of 
Arrow's  learning-by-doing  model,  and  the  mathematical  equations 
can be interpreted  equally  well in terms of  learning  by doing  that is 
incidental  to capital production. 
The  advantage  of  the  interpretation  that  knowledge  is compen- 
sated out of quasi rents is that it allows for intentional  private invest- 
ments  in research  and  development.  The  difficulty  is that it violates S78  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
the  logic  of  the  replication  argument.  If  the  input  AE  is  truly  the 
result of research and development,  it is a nonrival good.  In this case, 
the function  F(.) must be homogeneous  of degree  one in X alone and 
the Dasgupta  and Stiglitz (1988) argument  applies. If a nonrival input 
is even  partially excludable,  nonconvexities  are present  and a decen- 
tralized  equilibrium  cannot  be  sustained.  Stated  in  terms  of  cost 
curves, the replication  argument  implies that long-run  cost curves are 
horizontal  when  all rival inputs  are treated as variable. What appear 
to be quasi rents  are merely  competitive  returns  to rival factors that 
are in fixed  supply.  These  quasi rents cannot be used  to compensate 
both  the  innovation  activity and the rival fixed  factors. Even if these 
factors  are  in  fixed  supply  at the  aggregate  level,  they  presumably 
have alternative  uses and will not be supplied  to an activity if they are 
not paid their  marginal  product. 
An alternative approach  to growth theory with price-taking compe- 
tition  is  to  dispute  the  first  and  third  premises,  that  technological 
change  drives  growth  and  that knowledge  about the technology  is a 
nonrival  input.  Human  capital  models  such  as  those  presented  by 
King  and  Rebelo  (1987),  Jones  and  Manuelli  (1988),  Rebelo  (1988), 
and  Becker,  Murphy,  and  Tamura  (this issue)  treat all forms  of  in- 
tangible knowledge  as being analogous  to human capital skills that are 
rivalrous and excludable.  There  is no nonrival input like the technol- 
ogy and,  hence,  no nonconvexities  or spillovers. 
The  only  way  to  accept  all  three  premises  described  in  the  In- 
troduction  is to return  to the  suggestion  of  Schumpeter  (1942)  and 
explicitly  introduce  market  power.  Shell  (1973)  described  a model 
with a single  monopolist  who  invests in technological  change,  but as 
he  recognizes,  it is difficult  to give  an aggregate  interpretation  to a 
model  dominated  by a single firm. In a recent paper (Romer  1987), I 
presented  a model  with  market  power  but also with free  entry  and 
many  firms.  It builds  on  the  model  of  monopolistic  competition  in 
consumption  goods  formulated  by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), applied in 
a dynamic  setting  by Judd  (1985),  used  in a dynamic  model  of trade 
by Grossman  and  Helpman  (1989c),  and  extended  to differentiated 
inputs  in  production  by Ethier  (1982).  The  specification  used  here 
differs  from  that in my earlier paper primarily because it emphasizes 
the importance  of human  capital in the research process. The  earlier 
model  showed  that scale is an important  determinant  of  the rate of 
growth.  The  analysis here  shows that the correct measure  of scale is 
not  population  but human  capital. 
III.  Description  of  the  Model 
The  four basic inputs  in this model  are capital, labor, human  capital, 
and  an index  of  the  level  of  the  technology.  Capital is measured  in TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  S79 
units of  consumption  goods.  Labor services L are skills such  as eye- 
hand  coordination  that  are  available from  a healthy  physical body. 
They  are measured  by counts of people.  As used here, human capital 
H  is a distinct  measure  of  the  cumulative  effect  of  activities such as 
formal  education  and on-the-job  training. 
The  concept  of human  capital as years of education  or training that 
are person  specific  is close  to the one  used  in labor market contexts 
(e.g.,  Heckman  1976; Rosen  1976).  It corresponds  to the practice in 
growth  accounting  applications  that take account  of  changes  in the 
quality of  the  labor force  due  to changes  in observables  such as the 
level  of  education  and  experience  (see,  e.g.,  Gollop  and Jorgenson 
1980). This  concept  of human  capital is more limited than the notion 
used in theoretical  models  of growth based on unlimited human capi- 
tal accumulation  such as those  presented  by King and Rebelo (1987), 
Lucas  (1988),  and  Becker  et al. (this issue).  These  models  implicitly 
combine  a notion  of knowledge  that can outlive any individual with a 
labor market notion  of  human  capital that does  not. 
The  model  used here separates the rival component  of knowledge, 
H,  from  the nonrival,  technological  component,  A. Because  it has an 
existence  that  is  separate  from  that  of  any  individual,  A can  grow 
without bound.  In the specific formulation  used below, each new unit 
of knowledge  corresponds  to a design  for a new good,  so there is no 
conceptual  problem  measuring  A.  It  is  a  count  of  the  number  of 
designs. 
The  formal  model  of the economy  has three sectors. The  research 
sector  uses  human  capital  and  the  existing  stock  of  knowledge  to 
produce  new  knowledge.  Specifically,  it  produces  designs  for  new 
producer  durables.  An  intermediate-goods  sector  uses  the  designs 
from the research sector together  with forgone  output to produce the 
large number  of producer  durables that are available for use in final- 
goods  production  at any time. In practice, one might expect  research 
on  a new  design  and  the  production  of  the  new  good  to take place 
within the same firm, and nothing  in the analysis here rules this out; 
design  work can take place either internally or in a separate firm that 
sells its patent  to the firm that will produce  the actual good.  A final- 
goods  sector  uses labor, human  capital, and the set of  producer  du- 
rables that are available to produce  final output.  Output can be either 
consumed  or saved  as new capital. 
To  keep  the  dynamic  analysis simple  and  highlight  the  effects  of 
interest,  several simplifying  assumptions  are used. The first is that the 
population  and  the supply  of labor are both constant. This  rules out 
an analysis of fertility, labor force  participation, or variation in hours 
worked  per  worker.  The  second  is  that  the  total  stock  of  human 
capital in the population  is fixed and that the fraction supplied  to the 
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is fixed.  The  assumption  on H is made  largely for technical reasons. 
The  dynamic  analysis is greatly simplified  by restricting  attention  to 
equilibria  with  constant  growth  rates.  In  a stationary  population  in 
which  people  have  finite lives, the only feasible constant  growth rate 
for total years of education  or experience  is zero. A more complicated 
dynamic analysis could consider  the effects of the kinds of increases in 
H and L that have been  observed  historically, but even in this kind of 
analysis, H  must ultimately  approach  an upper  bound. 
The  other  simplifying  assumptions  are  extreme  assumptions  on 
factor  intensities.  One  has  already  been  made  implicitly.  Assuming 
that  capital  can  be  accumulated  as forgone  output  is equivalent  to 
assuming  that capital goods  are produced  in a separate sector that has 
the same technology  as the final-output  sector. Forgoing consumption 
is then  equivalent  to shifting  resources  from  the consumption  sector 
into  the  capital  sector.  Also,  the  plausible  assertion  that research  is 
relatively  human  capital-  and  knowledge-intensive  is translated into 
an extreme  specification  in which only knowledge  and human capital 
are used  to produce  new designs  or knowledge.  Labor and capital do 
not enter  at all. These  kinds of restrictions will reduce  the analysis of 
the  dynamics  of  this  system  to  a  system  of  equations  that  can  be 
explicitly  solved  by doing  algebra.  Presumably,  a relaxation  of  these 
assumptions  that  preserves  the  factor  intensity  orderings  used  here 
would  not change  the basic dynamics  of the  model. 
Final output  Y in this model  is expressed  as a function  of  physical 
labor L, human  capital devoted  to final output Hy, and physical capi- 
tal. The  unusual  feature  of the production  technology  assumed  here 
is that it disaggregates  capital into an infinite number of distinct types 
of  producer  durables.  For now,  let these  durables  be indexed  by an 
integer  i. (Soon,  the index  i will be assumed  to be a continuous  vari- 
able  instead  of  a discrete  one  to  avoid  integer  constraints.)  Only  a 
finite  number  of  these  potential  inputs,  the  ones  that have  already 
been invented  and designed,  are available for use at any time. Thus if 
x  =  {xj}  ',.  is the  list of  inputs  used  by a firm  that  produces  final 
output,  there is some value A such that x, =  0 for all i -  A. Because A 
changes  as new producer  durables  are invented,  it is important  to be 
able to describe final output  as a stationary function  of all conceivable 
input  lists. 
In this kind of environment,  a simple functional  form for output is 
the  following  extension  of  the Cobb-Douglas  production  function: 
Y(Hy, L, x)  =  Ho'Ls  x-  .  (1  ) 
This  production  function  differs  from the usual production  function TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  S8i 
only  in its assumption  about  the  degree  to which different  types  of 
capital goods  are substitutes for each other. In the conventional  speci- 
fication,  total capital K is implicitly defined  as being  proportional  to 
the  sum  of  all the  different  types  of  capital. This  definition  implies 
that all capital goods  are perfect  substitutes. One additional  dollar of 
capital  in  the  form  of  a truck has  the  same  effect  on  the  marginal 
productivity  of mainframe  computers  as an additional  dollar's worth 
of  computers.  Equation  (1) expresses  output  as an  additively  sepa- 
rable function  of  all the  different  types of  capital goods  so that one 
additional  dollar of trucks has no effect  on the marginal productivity 
of computers. 
Among  the various types of capital goods,  one can imagine  pairs of 
inputs  that  are  close  substitutes  (trucks  and  trains),  pairs  that  are 
complements  (computers  and communications  networks),  and many 
pairs that fall somewhere  in between.  The  conventional  formulation 
explores  the  case  in  which  all durables  are  perfect  substitutes.  The 
model  here  considers  the  case in which  all durables  have  additively 
separable  effects  on  output.  An investigation  of complementarity  as 
well as of mixtures  of types of substitutability is left for future  work. 
Because  the production  function  in equation  (1) is homogeneous  of 
degree  one, output  in the final-goods  sector can be described in terms 
of the actions of a single, aggregate,  price-taking firm. The sector that 
produces  producer  durables,  however,  cannot be described by a rep- 
resentative  firm. There  is a distinct firm i for each durable  good  i. A 
firm must purchase  or produce  a design  for good  i before  commenc- 
ing production.  Once it owns the design,  the firm can convert -q  units 
of  final output  into  one  durable  unit  of  good  i. As in the  standard 
one-sector  model,  the  formal  specification  here  describes  the  sector 
that produces  capital goods as a black box that takes final output in on 
one  side  and  gives  capital  goods  out  of  the  other  side.  The  correct 
interpretation  of this formal description  is that the forgone  consump- 
tion is never manufactured.  The  resources that would have been used 
to produce  the forgone  output  are used instead to manufacture  capi- 
tal goods.  It is possible  to exchange  a constant  number  of consump- 
tion  goods  for each  unit of  capital goods  if the production  function 
used  to  manufacture  capital  goods  has  exactly  the  same  functional 
form  as the  production  function  used  to manufacture  consumption 
goods. 
Once a firm has produced  a design for durable i, it can obtain an in- 
finitely lived patent on that design.  If the firm manufactures x(i) units 
of the durable, it rents those durables to final-output firms for a rental 
rate p(i). Since firm i will be the only seller of capital good i, it will face 
a downward-sloping  demand  curve  for  its good.  Since  the  durables 
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present discounted  value of the infinite stream of rental income that it 
generates. 
There  are many equivalent institutional arrangements  that can sup- 
port  any  given  equilibrium.  In what follows,  the  firm that owns the 
patent  on the design  for durable  i is assumed  to be the only one that 
manufactures  it, but this is only a convenience.  Whether the owner of 
the patent  manufactures  the good  itself or licenses others to do so, it 
can extract  the  same  monopoly  profit.  Design  of  new  durables  and 
manufacturing  could  take place within the same firm, but it is easier 
to describe  the equilibrium  if the research  and development  depart- 
ment  is treated  as a separate  firm and designs  are transferred  for an 
explicit  price.  It  is  also  easier  to  assume  that  the  firm  that  buys  a 
design  and  manufactures  a differentiated  producer  durable rents its 
durables  instead  of  selling  them  outright.  In  particular,  this  shows 
that  there  are  market  mechanisms  that  avoid  the  usual  durable- 
goods-monopoly  problem.  Provided  that  the  manufacturer  of  the 
durable could commit to levels of output,  nothing  would change if the 
durables  were  sold  instead  of  rented.  The  analysis is further  simpli- 
fied by assuming  that the durables do not depreciate.  Adding  depre- 
ciation would  merely  add a familiar term to the user cost of capital. 
In parallel with the usual one-sector  model  and in conformity  with 
national  income  accounting  conventions,  it is useful  to define  an ac- 
counting  measure  of  total  capital K as cumulative  forgone  output. 
Thus  K(t) evolves  according  to the rule 
K (t) =  Y(t) -  C(t),  (2) 
where  C(t) denotes  aggregate  consumption  at time t. Because  it takes 
-  units  of  forgone  consumption  to  create  one  unit  of  any  type  of 
durable,  this accounting  measure  K is related  to  the  durable  goods 
that  are  actually  used  in  production  by the  rule K  =  I  I  = 
-q mu41=  1 X. 
Thus  H  and L are fixed,  and K grows  by the  amount  of  forgone 
consumption.  It remains  to specify  the process  for the accumulation 
of  new  designs,  that  is, for  the  growth  of A(t). As noted  above,  re- 
search  output  depends  on  the  amount  of  human  capital devoted  to 
research.  It  also  depends  on  the  stock  of  knowledge  available to  a 
person  doing  research.  If designs  were treated as discrete indivisible 
objects that are not  produced  by a deterministic  production  process, 
the  production  technology  for  designs  would  have  to  take  explicit 
account  of  both  integer  constraints  and  uncertainty.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  both  indivisibility  and  uncertainty  are  important  at the 
micro level  and over short periods  of time. The  simplifying  assump- 
tion  made  here  is  that  neither  is  crucial  to  a  first-pass  analysis  of 
technological  change  at the  aggregate  level.  Henceforth,  the index  i TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  S83 
for  the  different  types  of  goods  is treated  as a continuous  variable, 
and the sum in equation  (1) is replaced  by an integral: 
Y(Hy,L,x)  =  HyLP  x(i)1-t-di.  (1') 
(Here  x  must  be  interpreted  as  a  function  from  an  appropriately 
defined  function  space.) With this formal structure, the output of new 
designs  produced  by  researcher  j  can  be  written  as  a continuous, 
deterministic  function  of  the  inputs  applied.  If  the  researcher  pos- 
sesses an amount  of human  capital HI  and has access to a portion Al 
of the total stock of knowledge  implicit in previous designs, the rate of 
production  of new designs  by researchers  will be 8HJA-,  where 8 is a 
productivity  parameter. 
This formulation  with a continuum  of goods is close to that used by 
Judd  (1985)  in his discussion  of  patents.  He  also studies  the process 
whereby  goods  are  introduced  as  new  patents  are  produced.  The 
model  here  corresponds  to Judd's  discussion  of  the  case  in  which 
patents are infinitely lived. The  main differences  are that Judd  treats 
the differentiated  goods  as consumption  goods  rather than producer 
durables  and uses a form  of exogenous  technological  change  to gen- 
erate growth of productivity  in the research sector. Here, growth in A 
by itself  increases  the  productivity  of  human  capital in the  research 
sector. 
Although  other  assumptions  about  secrecy  and  property  rights 
could be considered,  the equilibrium  here is based on the assumption 
that anyone  engaged  in research has free access to the entire stock of 
knowledge.  This is feasible because knowledge  is a nonrival input. All 
researchers  can  take  advantage  of  A  at the  same  time.  The  output 
of researchers  is therefore  8H1A.  If we sum across all people  engaged 
in research,  the aggregate  stock of designs  evolves  according  to 
A  =  8HAA,  (3) 
where  HA  has the  obvious  interpretation  of  total human  capital em- 
ployed  in research. 
Equation  (3) contains  two  substantive  assumptions  and  two func- 
tional  form  assumptions.  The  first substantive assumption  is that de- 
voting  more  human  capital to research  leads to a higher  rate of pro- 
duction  of new designs.  The  second is that the larger the total stock of 
designs  and knowledge  is, the higher  the productivity of an engineer 
working  in the research  sector will be. According  to this specification, 
a  college-educated  engineer  working  today  and  one  working  100 
years ago have the same human capital, which is measured in terms of 
years  of  forgone  participation  in  the  labor  market.  The  engineer 
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tage of all the additional  knowledge  accumulated  as design  problems 
were  solved  during  the last 100 years. 
The  two functional  form assumptions  are that the output of designs 
is linear in each of HA and A when  the other  is held constant. These 
assumptions,  like  the  exclusion  of  the  inputs  L and  x( ),  are  made 
largely  for  analytical convenience.  Linearity  in HA  is not  important 
for the dynamic  properties  of the model, but weakening  this assump- 
tion would  require a more detailed  specification of how income in the 
research  sector is allocated  to the participants. 
Linearity  in A is what  makes  unbounded  growth  possible,  and  in 
this  sense,  unbounded  growth  is  more  like  an  assumption  than  a 
result  of  the  model.  In  what  follows,  it  will become  clear  that  the 
marginal  product  of human  capital Hy employed  in the manufactur- 
ing  sector  grows  in proportion  to A. If A were  replaced  in equation 
(3) by some concave  function  of A-that  is, if the marginal productiv- 
ity of human  capital in the research sector does  not continue  to grow 
in proportion  to A-human  capital employed  in research would shift 
out of research and into manufacturing  as A becomes larger. This will 
cause  the  rate  of  growth  to  slow  down.  Whether  opportunities  in 
research  are actually petering  out, or will eventually  do so, is an em- 
pirical question  that this kind of theory cannot resolve. The  specifica- 
tion  here,  in which  unbounded  growth  at a constant  rate is feasible, 
was chosen  because  there  is no evidence  from  recent  history to sup- 
port the belief  that opportunities  for research are diminishing.  More- 
over,  linearity  in A is convenient  analytically, and assumptions  about 
what will happen  in the far future  for values of A that are very large 
relative  to  the  current  level  have  very  little  effect  on  the  question 
of  interest:  How  do  other  variables in  the  model  affect  the  rate of 
growth  of A? 
The  crucial feature  of the specification  used here is that knowledge 
enters  into production  in two distinct ways. A new design  enables the 
production  of a new good  that can be used to produce  output.  A new 
design  also  increases  the  total  stock  of  knowledge  and  thereby  in- 
creases the productivity  of human  capital in the research sector. The 
owner of a design  has property rights over its use in the production  of 
a new producer  durable but not over its use in research.  If an inven- 
tor has a patented  design  for widgets, no one can make or sell widgets 
without  the  agreement  of  the  inventor.  On  the  other  hand,  other 
inventors  are free  to spend  time studying  the patent  application  for 
the widget  and learn knowledge  that helps in the design  of a wodget. 
The  inventor  of  the  widget  has  no  ability to stop  the  inventor  of  a 
wodget  from  learning  from  the design  of a widget.  This  means  that 
the benefits  from the first productive  role for a design  are completely TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  S85 
excludable,  whereas  the benefits from the second are completely  non- 
excludable.  In  an overall  sense,  this means  that the  nonrival  design 
inputs  are partially excludable. 
In  theory  and  in  practice,  there  is always some  ambiguity  about 
what  constitutes  a  design  for  a  new  and  different  good  and  what 
constitutes  a copy of an existing  design.  In the model,  this ambiguity 
is artificially resolved  by the form of the production  function  Y. This 
functional  form implies that new goods  are never close substitutes for 
existing  goods  since all the producer  durables  enter  into production 
in an additively separable  fashion.  (See Pascoa [1986] for a discussion 
of  this  general  property  of  "no  neighboring  goods.")  Although  it 
greatly  simplifies  the  analysis,  this  is  not  a  realistic  feature  of  the 
model.  In particular, it rules out the possibility of obsolescence.  None- 
theless,  the  general  results  here  should  be  robust  to  more  careful 
modeling  of  the  nature  of  the interaction  between  different  special- 
ized  producer  durables.  What  matters  for  the  results  is  that  the 
knowledge  is a nonrival good  that is partially excludable  and privately 
provided. 
At  the  aggregate  level,  HA  and  Hy  are  related  by the  constraint 
Hy  +  HA  =  H. According  to these  equations,  any person can devote 
human  capital to either the final-output  sector or the research sector. 
Implicitly this formulation  neglects  the fact that L and H are supplied 
jointly.  To  take the  equations  used  here  literally, one  must imagine 
that there  are some  skilled  persons  who  specialize  in human  capital 
accumulation  and  supply  no labor. 
To  fix  notation  for  prices,  let  spot  prices  at any point  in time be 
measured  in units of current output  and let r denote  the interest rate 
on  loans  denominated  in goods.  Let PA  denote  the price of  new de- 
signs,  and  let  WH denote  the  rental  rate  per  unit  of  human  capital. 
Because  goods  can  be  converted  into  capital one  for  one,  the  spot 
price  for  capital  is  one  and  its  rate  of  return  is r. Because  of  the 
assumption  that anyone  engaged  in research  can freely  take advan- 
tage of  the entire  existing  stock of designs  in doing  research  to pro- 
duce  new  designs,  it follows  from  equation  (3) that PA  and  WH are 
related  by WH  =  PA 8A. 
Once  a  design  has  been  produced,  a  large  number  of  potential 
suppliers  of  the  new  good  bid for  the  right  to do  so. Each of  these 
firms takes the price PA for designs,  the price of one for capital goods, 
and the interest  rate as given,  but if it begins production  it sets prices 
to maximize  profits.  Formally,  it helps  to let the rental price p(i)  for 
the ith  durable  lie in the range  R  +  U {oo} for its durable  good.  If no 
firm produces  good  i, its price can be understood  to be p(i)  =  oo. 
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including  infinite  prices for the durables that have not been invented 
yet, the representative  final-output  firm chooses  a profit-maximizing 
quantity x(i) for each durable.  Because it is a constant-returns-to-scale 
firm, its input demands  are defined  only after the scale of operation is 
pinned  down.  Let L and Hy be the total amounts of labor and human 
capital  that  are  used  in  the  production  of  final-output  goods.  (The 
split of total H between Hy and HA remains to be determined.)  Given 
values for Hy and L, it is possible to derive the aggregate  demand  for 
the  durables  from  a  maximization  problem  that  is  conditional  on 
them: 
max  H  [HyLx(i)  13-  pp(i)x(i)]di. 
X 
Differentiating  under  the  integral  sign  leads  to an inverse  demand 
function 
p(i)  =  (1  -  o  -  P)HyL  x(i-a.  (4) 
(There  is  an  important  technical  issue  about  what  it means  to  the 
final-goods  producer  if prices change  on a set of values of i that has 
measure  zero.  Because  of  the  symmetry  in  this  model,  eq.  [4] can 
readily be derived  by a limiting argument.  For a general discussion of 
this issue,  see  Pascoa [1986,  1990].) 
The  demand  curve  in  equation  (4) is what  the  producer  of  each 
specialized  durable  takes as given  in choosing  the profit-maximizing 
price to set. Faced with given  values of Hy, L, and r, a firm that has 
already  incurred  the  fixed-cost  investment  in a design  will choose  a 
level of output  x to maximize  its revenue  minus variable cost at every 
date: 
wrr  =  max p(x)x  -  rqx 
x  (5) 
=  max(I  -  t-  )HyLxlx 
1  -  rqx. 
The  flow of rental income  is p(x) times x. The  cost is the interest cost 
on the  qx units of output  needed  to produce  x durables. To keep the 
analysis  simple,  it is convenient  to  assume  that  the  capital is putty- 
putty,  so that the firm can solve this problem  at every point  in time, 
converting  units of  durables  back into general  capital, and avoid the 
interest  cost if it decides  to supply  fewer  units. At any date,  the only 
sunk cost is the initial expenditure  on the design.  This assumption  is 
harmless  because  the  demand  for  durables  is stationary  in  equilib- 
rium,  so no disinvestment  ever takes place. 
The  monopoly  pricing problem specified in equation  (5) is that of a TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  S87 
firm  with  constant  marginal  cost  that  faces  a constant  elasticity de- 
mand  curve.  The  resulting  monopoly  price is a simple  markup over 
marginal  cost,  where  the  markup  is determined  by the  elasticity of 
demand,  p  =  r/(l  -  ox -  13).  The  flow of  monopoly  profit is ir  = 
(cx ?  13)px,  where  x is the quantity on  the demand  curve (4) implied 
by the price p. 
Each  producer  of  specialized  durables  must  rent  its output  to  a 
large number  of final-goods  producers  that can operate  at any scale. 
By assumption,  it is not possible for the producer  to monitor  the use 
of  its durables.  As a result,  price  discrimination  is not  feasible.  The 
best the  firm can do  is charge  the simple  monopoly  price. 
The  decision  to  produce  a  new  specialized  input  depends  on  a 
comparison  of  the discounted  stream of net revenue  and the cost PA 
of the initial investment  in a design.  Because the market for designs is 
competitive,  the price for designs  will be bid up until it is equal to the 
present  value  of  the  net  revenue  that a monopolist  can extract.  At 
every date  t, it must therefore  be true that 
-e  tr(s)d  I  r  (T)dT  =  PA(t)-  (6) 
If PA  is constant  (as it will be in the equilibrium described below), this 
condition  can  be  put  in a more  intuitive  form.  Differentiating  with 
respect  to time t yields 
rr(t)  -  r(t)  ef-  t  r(s)%dsTr  (T)dT  =  0. 
Substituting  in the expression  for PA from  equation  (6) yields 
rr(t) =  r(t)PA.  (6') 
This  equation  says that at every  point  in time,  the instantaneous  ex- 
cess of revenue  over marginal cost must be just sufficient to cover the 
interest cost on the initial investment  in a design.  (This formulation  of 
the intertemporal  zero profit constraint  is taken from Grossman and 
Helpman  [1989c].) 
The  solution  of the model  for a balanced growth equilibrium given 
in  Section  V  shows  that  the  technology  described  above  implies  a 
negatively  sloped  linear relation between  the rate of growth of output 
and the rate of return  on investment.  To  close the model,  it remains 
to specify  preferences  that imply a parallel relation between  the rate 
of  growth  of  consumption  and  the  marginal  rate  of  intertemporal 
substitution.  This  relation  is  easily  derived  for  Ramsey  consumers 
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I  U(C)e-Ptdt,  with U(C) =  Cl  -  for  E  [0, oc). 
The  implied  intertemporal  optimization  condition  for  a  consumer 
faced with a fixed  interest  rate r is that C IC =  (r -  p)/u. Preferences 
enter the solution of the model only through  this relation between the 
consumption  growth  rate and the interest  rate. 
The  consumers  are endowed  with fixed  quantities  of  labor L and 
human  capital H that are supplied  inelastically. At time 0, consumers 
own  the  existing  durable-goods-producing  firms,  and  the  net  reve- 
nues  of  these  firms are paid to consumers  as dividends.  Final-goods 
firms earn  zero  profits and own  no assets, so they can be ignored  in 
the specification  of  endowments. 
An  equilibrium  for  this model  will be  paths  for  prices and  quan- 
tities such that (i) consumers  make savings and consumption  decisions 
taking  interest  rates  as  given;  (ii) holders  of  human  capital decide 
whether  to work in the  research  sector or the manufacturing  sector 
taking  as given  the  stock of  total knowledge  A, the  price of  designs 
PA, and the wage rate in the manufacturing  sector WA;  (iii) final-goods 
producers  choose  labor,  human  capital,  and  a list of  differentiated 
durables  taking prices as given;  (iv) each firm that owns a design  and 
manufactures  a producer  durable  maximizes  profit  taking  as given 
the  interest  rate  and  the  downward-sloping  demand  curve  it faces, 
and setting  prices to maximize  profits; (v) firms contemplating  entry 
into  the  business  of  producing  a durable  take prices  for  designs  as 
given;  and  (vi) the supply  of  each good  is equal to the demand. 
IV.  Discussion  of the  Model 
A reasonable  intuition  for the behavior of this model  can be inferred 
by considering  the Solow (1956)  model,  in which the evolution  of A is 
given  exogenously,  and the Uzawa (1965)  model,  in which the evolu- 
tion  of  A  is  determined  by  the  allocation  of  resources  between  a 
research sector and a final-goods  sector. For a fixed amount of A, and 
therefore  a fixed set of producer  durables, the model is almost identi- 
cal to the Solow model.  Because  of the symmetry in the model, all the 
durable goods  that are available are supplied  at the same level, hence- 
forth  denoted  as x. If they were not, it would be possible to increase 
profits in the producer  durable sector by reducing  the output of high- 
output  firms  and  diverting  the  capital  released  in  this way to  low- 
output  goods.  Since A determines  the range  of  durables  that can be 
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goods,  it is possible  to solve  for x from  the equation K  =  nrAx.  Then 
output  Y can be written  as 
,00 
Y(HA,  L, x)  =  HOL  {x(i)1-t-  di 
=  HyLA(Ax-)  7-13 
K  l-aot-03  (7) 
-qAx 
=  (HyA)a(LA)P(K)1-`aPq-a+P,1. 
The  last line of  this equation  shows that the model  behaves just  like 
the  neoclassical  model  with  labor  and  human  capital  augmenting 
technological  change.  In particular, it exhibits  the usual diminishing 
returns  to capital accumulation.  Given the assumed  form  of  prefer- 
ences,  a fixed level of A will lead to an equilibrium  with a steady state 
in  which  the  level  of  K is determined  by the  requirement  that the 
marginal  product  of capital is equal to the discount  rate. If A grew at 
an exogenously  specified  exponential  rate, the  economy  would  con- 
verge  to a path on which K grows at the same exponential  rate as A, 
just  as it does in the Solow model.  Along  the transition path, the ratio 
of K to A would  change,  which implies  that r and x would change  as 
well. Along  the balanced  growth path, r, x, and the ratio of K to A are 
all constant. 
The  nonconvexity  evident  in  the  expression  for  final output  as a 
function  of  the  primary  inputs  of  the  model  (H, L,  K,  and  A)  is 
supported  in a decentralized  equilibrium  that relies on monopolistic 
competition.  In  contrast,  the  nonconvexity  present  in  equation  (3) 
describing  output  of  designs  is supported  through  competition  with 
external effects  that arise from knowledge  spillovers. In each case, the 
nonconvexity  arises because  the  nonrival  good  A is an input  in pro- 
duction.  In the final-output  sector, A matters indirectly because of its 
effects  on the availability of the new x( ) goods.  In the research sector, 
A enters  directly. 
Both  spillovers  and  price  setting  seem  essential  to  capturing  the 
features  of knowledge  in a model of growth. There  is little doubt that 
much  of  the  value  to society of  any given  innovation  or discovery  is 
not captured  by the inventor,  and any model  that missed these  spill- 
overs would  miss important  elements  of the growth process.  Yet it is 
still the case that private, profit-maximizing  agents make investments 
in the creation of new knowledge  and that they earn a return on these 
investments  by charging  a price for the resulting  goods that is greater 
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V.  Solution  of  the  Model  for  a Balanced  Growth 
Equilibrium 
The  strategy  for characterizing  the  model  that is followed  here  is to 
solve  for  an equilibrium  in which  the  variables A, K, and  Y grow at 
constant  exponential  rates. This is generally referred  to as a balanced 
growth  equilibrium.  The  intuition  from  the  Solow  model  suggests 
that such an equilibrium  will exist if A grows at a constant exponential 
rate. The  intuition  from  the Uzawa model  suggests  that it is possible 
for A  to  grow  at an  exponential  rate because  equation  (3) for A  is 
linear  in A.  It will grow  at a constant  rate if the  amount  of  human 
capital HA  that is devoted  to research stays constant.  Verifying  that a 
balanced  growth  equilibrium  exists therefore  reduces to the problem 
of  showing  that  prices  and  wages  are  such  that Hy  and  HA  remain 
constant  as Y, K, C, and A grow. 
By  focusing  only  on  balanced  growth  paths,  the  analysis neglects 
the  transient  dynamics  that  arise  when  the  economy  starts from  a 
ratio of K to A that differs  from the ratio that is maintained  along the 
balanced  growth  path.  One  should  be able  to study convergence  to 
the balanced  growth  ratio of K to A using  the tools used for studying 
the Solow and Uzawa models,  but this analysis is not attempted  here. 
The  first step in the solution  of the model  is to derive  the relation 
between  the  growth  rate of output  and  the rate of  return  on invest- 
ment.  Coupled  with  the  relation  between  interest  rates and  growth 
rates implied  by the preference  side of the model,  this will determine 
the  rate  of  growth  and  interest  rate.  Given  the  intuition  from  the 
Solow  model  and  the  results  derived  in my earlier  model  of  differ- 
entiated  inputs  (Romer  1987),  it  follows  that  along  the  balanced 
growth  path,  the  ratio of  K to A should  be  constant,  which  implies 
that x is constant  as well. Because  of the accumulation  of both K and 
A,  the  wage  paid  for  human  capital  in  the  final-output  sector  will 
grow  in  proportion  to  A,  but  by  equation  (3),  the  productivity  of 
human  capital  in  research  also grows  in proportion  to A. Since  the 
productivity  of human  capital grows at the same rate in both sectors, 
Hy  and  HA  will  remain  constant  if  the  price  PA  for  new  designs  is 
constant. 
Figure  1 illustrates the behavior of the inputs in the model.  All the 
producer  durables  that have been  designed  up to time  t are used  at 
the level x that indicates  the height  of the rectangle.  The  width is the 
measure  of  the number  of designs  or durables  in use, A(t). The  area 
A(t)x is equal to total capital divided  by  q. Over time, x remains con- 
stant and A grows at a constant  exponential  rate. 
It remains  to check that this description  of a balanced growth path 
is consistent  with all the equilibrium  conditions.  As noted  in the dis- TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  S91 
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FIG.  1.-Producer  durables  used  in production  at time t and t' >  t 
cussion  following  the monopoly  profit problem  (5), the flow of profit 
that can be extracted  by the  seller of  any particular durable  input  is 
,r =  (cx +  I)px-. Since  the  present  discounted  value  of  this  stream 
of  profit must equal  the price PA of  the design,  it follows  that 
PA  =  Tr=  O  =  (1 -  )-  HyL 
-  .  (8) 
r  r  r 
The  last equality  in  this expression  follows  by using  equation  (4) to 
evaluate p in terms of x. 
The  condition  determining  the allocation of human capital between 
the final-output  and  research  sectors says that the wages paid to hu- 
man  capital  in  each  sector  must  be  the  same.  In  the  final-output 
sector,  the  wage  for  human  capital  is  its  marginal  product.  Since 
human  capital receives  all the  income  from  the  research  sector,  the 
wage  there  is PAMA.  To  equalize  returns  to  human  capital  in  both 
sectors, Hy  =  H  -  HA must be chosen  so that 
WH  =  PA8A  =  oH  L- L  xl  di 
o  ~~~~~~~(9) 
=  OtHy  1L AxR1- 
Substituting  PA from  equation  (8) into  equation  (9) and  simplifying 
yield 
81  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  (10) 
For a fixed value of HA  = H -Hy,  the implied exponential  growth 
rate for A is 6HA.  From the monopoly  pricing problem, we know that S92  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
x is constant  if r is. The  intuition  from the Solow model  suggests, and 
examination  of  the expression  for final output 
Y =  HOLyP{  x  l-cx-di  =  HyLAx-' 
from equation  (7) shows, that output  grows at the same rate as A if L, 
Hy, and x are fixed.  If x is fixed, then K must grow at the same rate as 
A, because  total usage of capital is Axq.  Let g denote  the growth rate 
of A, Y, and K. Since KIY is a constant,  the ratio 
C  =  1 _  K  =  1-  KK 
y  y  K  Y 
must also be constant.  The  common  growth  rate g for all these  vari- 
ables is therefore 
C  Y  K  A 
Together  with equation  (10), the constraint Hy  =  H  -  HA  implies a 
relation  between  the growth  rate g and the interest  rate r: 
g  =  6HA  =  8H-  (1  -a  t-  )(  +  r)  (11) 
which can be simplified  as 
g=  6HA  =H  -Ar,  (11') 
where  A is a constant  that depends  on  the technology  parameters  ox 
and  1, 
(1A  -  x-  )(cx+13)  (12) 
Implicitly,  the allocation  of H between  the two sectors is constrained 
by the requirement  that HA must be nonnegative  and that Hy can be 
no larger than H. This implies that g is nonnegative.  If this constraint 
is binding,  equation  (10) will hold  as an inequality. 
To  close  the model,  it remains  to impose  the relation between  the 
growth rate g and the interest rate r implied by the preference  side of 
the model,  g  =  C/  C  =  (r -  p)/o-. Combined  with equation  (11), this 
gives an expression  for g in terms of the fundamentals  of the model, 
H-  Ap 
g  A+  A1'  (13) 
where  A is as defined  in equation  (12). 
The  expression  for the  growth  rate suggests  a minor  technical re- TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  S93 
striction.  For the integral  in the consumer's  preferences  to be finite, 
the  rate of  growth  of  current  utility (1  -  u)g must be less than the 
discount  rate p. Thus,  for  a E  [0, 1), (1  -ur)86H/(A  +  1) must be less 
than  the  discount  rate  p. If  this does  not  hold,  the  integral  can be 
infinite  and  some  kind  of  overtaking  criterion  must  be  used  to de- 
scribe the behavior  of  the consumer. 
VI.  Interpretation  and Welfare  Properties 
of the  Solution 
Almost  all  the  content  of  the  model  is contained  in  equation  (11), 
which summarizes  the effects  of  the technological  side of the model, 
including  the effects  of imperfect  competition  in the market for pro- 
ducer  durables.  Part of  the intuition  behind  equation  (11) is easy to 
grasp. The  opportunity  cost of human  capital is the wage income that 
can be earned  instantaneously  in the manufacturing  sector. The  re- 
turn to investing  human  capital in research is a stream of net revenue 
that a design  generates  in the future.  If the interest rate is larger, the 
present  discounted  value of  the stream of  net revenue  will be lower. 
Less  human  capital  will  be  allocated  to  research,  and  the  rate  of 
growth  will be lower. 
Other aspects of the intuition  behind equation (1 1) are more subtle. 
The  surprising  feature  of  equation  (11)  is  that  neither  L  nor  the 
parameter  q is  present.  Equation  (4)  shows  that  an  increase  in  L 
increases  the  demand  faced  by each  monopolistic  firm selling  a du- 
rable good.  From the monopoly  problem  (5), it is clear that a reduc- 
tion in  q reduces  the costs of the monopolist  and increases output  x. 
In either  case, the stream of  net revenue  generated  by a new design 
increases.  Nonetheless,  the amount  of  human  capital devoted  to re- 
search increases  neither  when L increases  nor when  q falls. 
In  a  partial  equilibrium  analysis,  one  would  always  expect  any 
change  that increases  the  return  to an activity to increase  the alloca- 
tion of resources  to that activity. What a general  equilibrium  analysis 
emphasizes  is that any intervention  that increases  the  return  to one 
activity can very well increase  the  return  to some  other  activity that 
competes  with  the  first activity for  resources.  An  increase  in L  or a 
reduction  in  q (which increases x) raises the return  to human  capital 
employed  in manufacturing  at the same time that it raises the return 
to  human  capital  in  research.  For  the  functional  forms  used  here, 
these  two effects  exactly cancel.  The  allocation  of  human  capital be- 
tween  research  and  manufacturing  does  not  change  when  L  and  q 
change. 
This kind of exact cancellation  is not a robust feature of the model. S94  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
If slightly different  functional  forms  were  used,  the net effect  of  an 
increase in L or a decrease  in -q  could be either to increase or to reduce 
the  amount  of  human  capital  used  in  the  research  sector.  For ex- 
ample,  in an extension  of  this model  (Romer  1990),  I show how an 
increase in L could reduce  research effort and the rate of growth. The 
correct inference  from this model  is that the effect  of an increase in L 
or a decrease  in -q  on the rate of growth is ambiguous,  something  that 
a priori theorizing  cannot  resolve. 
This  ambiguity  contrasts  with  the  strong  and  robust  implication 
that reductions  in the interest rate will speed  up growth. Equivalently, 
from  equation  (12),  it follows  that any change  in the  preference  pa- 
rameters  that acts to reduce  the interest  rate (an increase in patience 
captured  by a decrease  in  the  discount  rate p, or an increase  in the 
intertemporal  rate of substitution,  as captured by a decrease in a) will 
increase  research  and growth.  This  implication  follows directly from 
the  assumption  that the  benefits  of  research  come  largely in the fu- 
ture and  that the costs are incurred  immediately. 
From a policy point of view, the difference  between a reduction in q 
and a reduction  in the equilibrium  interest  rate is very important.  A 
direct  subsidy  to investment  in physical capital financed  by a lump- 
sum tax is mathematically  equivalent  to a reduction  in  q. (An illustra- 
tion of  this easy result is given  in Romer  [1989].)  On  the basis of an 
intuition  developed  for the one-sector  model,  economists  often  iden- 
tify the marginal  product  of physical capital with the market interest 
rate. If they  were  the  same,  anything  that increases  the capital stock 
and reduces  the marginal  product  of physical capital would  have the 
same growth-enhancing  effect  as a reduction  in the interest rate. The 
intuition  that subsidies to physical capital accumulation  will also speed 
up growth  in A was reinforced  by the first generation  of endogenous 
growth models.  In Arrow's (1962a) model of learning by doing and in 
my first model  (Romer  1986),  the rate of  growth of A was forced  by 
assumption  to be the same as the rate of growth of K. As a result, an 
intervention  such  as an investment  tax credit  that increased  the  ac- 
cumulation  of K necessarily  increased  the accumulation  of A as well. 
The  model  presented  here shows that when the decision to invest in 
physical capital is uncoupled  from  the decision  to invest in research, 
the effects  of a subsidy to physical capital are quite different  from the 
effects  of a reduction  in the market interest rate. If the fundamental 
policy problem  is that we have too many lawyers and MBAs and not 
enough  engineers,  a  subsidy  to  physical  capital  accumulation  is  a 
weak, and  possibly counterproductive,  policy response. 
In  the  previous  paper  with  differentiated  producer  durables 
(Romer  1987),  I found  that an increase in scale measured  by L would 
increase  the  rate  of  growth.  Here,  an  increase  in L has  no  effect. TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  S95 
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FIG. 2.-Growth  rate and amount  of human  capital in research as a function  of total 
human  capital (for  8  =  1). 
Instead,  an increase in scale as measured  by total human capital H has 
the effect  of speeding  up the rate of growth.  This effect  is illustrated 
in figure  2, which plots the rate of growth and the amount  of human 
capital used  in research  as a function  of total human  capital. Both of 
these  models  have  an  underlying  form  of  increasing  returns  in  re- 
search. As a result, an increase  in a scale variable induces  an increase 
in the rate of  growth.  Human  capital is the relevant  scale variable in 
this  model  because  it  is  the  input  that  is  used  most  intensively  in 
research. 
That the research  sector in this model exhibits increasing returns is 
clear from equation  (4). If the research technology  exhibited  constant 
returns to scale, a doubling  of both the human capital and the stock of 
knowledge  would  leave  the  marginal  product  of  human  capital  in 
research unchanged.  Under  the specification used here, a doubling  of 
both leads to an increase in the marginal product of human capital in 
research.  As a result,  a permanent  increase  in the total stock of  hu- 
man capital in the population  leads to an increase in the ratio of A to 
K and  a more  than  proportional  increase  in the  amount  of  human 
capital that is devoted  to the research sector, as illustrated in figure 2. 
This  implication  is  of  interest  from  both  a  historical  and  a  cross- 
sectional  point  of  view.  It  is  surely  the  case  that  the  total  level  of 
human  capital and the fraction of human  capital devoted  to research 
are higher  now than they were at any time in the past. Moreover,  the 
fraction of human  capital devoted  to research is apparently highest in 
the  most developed  countries  of  the world. 
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of human  capital is too small, stagnation may arise. If H is too low, the 
nonnegativity  constraint  on  HA  is binding  and  growth does  not take 
place.  In  this case,  all the  feasible  growth  rates for A are  too  small 
relative  to the  discount  rate to justify  the sacrifice in current  output 
necessary for growth to take place. This result offers one possible way 
to explain  the wide  variation  in growth  rates observed  among  coun- 
tries and the fact that in some  countries  growth in income  per capita 
has been close to zero. This explanation  is reminiscent of the explana- 
tion  for  the  absence  of  growth  in prehistoric  time that is offered  by 
some  historians  and  anthropologists:  civilization, and  hence  growth, 
could not begin until human capital could be spared from the produc- 
tion of goods  for immediate  consumption.  This model cannot offer  a 
complete  explanation  for these observations because it treats the stock 
of  H  (and  of  L) as given,  but  it does  suggest  directions  for  further 
work. 
The  effects  of  a subsidy  to capital can be contrasted  with a policy 
designed  to  encourage  research.  A  subsidy  to  employment  in  the 
research sector that is financed  through  lump-sum  taxes has the same 
effects  on  growth  as an increase  in the  productivity  parameter  8  in 
equation  (3).  In  the  long  run,  the  subsidy  will cause  an increase  in 
the growth  rate, a fall in PA,  and a reduction  in x and in the ratio of 
K to A. 
There  are  two  reasons  to  expect  that  too  little  human  capital  is 
devoted  to  research.  The  most  obvious  reason  is that research  has 
positive  external  effects.  An additional  design  raises the productivity 
of  all future  individuals  who  do  research,  but because  this benefit  is 
nonexcludable,  it is not reflected at all in the market price for designs. 
The  second  and  an  equally  important  reason  why  too  little  human 
capital is devoted  to research is that research produces an input that is 
purchased  by a sector that engages  in monopoly  pricing. The  markup 
of  price  over  marginal  cost  forces  a  wedge  between  the  marginal 
social product  of an input  used in this sector and its market compen- 
sation. Equation (7) shows that a new design  (i.e., an additional unit of 
A) increases output  at every date by an amount HyLx--'  ; from the 
calculation  in  (5), the  producer  of  a design  captures  only  a fraction 
1 -  x -  13  of  this net benefit  to society. 
Both of these effects  cause human capital to be undercompensated. 
The  marginal  product  of capital in the manufacturing  sector is equal 
to  the  wage  WH,  but  the  marginal  product  in  the  research  sector  is 
higher  than  the  wage  because  the  price of  the  patent  captures  only 
part of the social value of the patent.  From equation  (9), (10), or (11), 
it follows  that  an  increase  in  total  human  capital would  lead  to  an 
increase  in  the  amount  of  human  capital employed  in the  research 
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unit of human  capital is higher  than the market wage. For simplicity, 
the model  here  has treated  the stock of  total human  capital as being 
exogenously  fixed,  so undercompensating  human  capital has no wel- 
fare  effects.  In a more  realistic model  in which human  capital is ac- 
cumulated  endogenously,  the  supply  will be  too  low.  As a result,  a 
second-best  policy for a government  that cannot affect the allocation 
of human  capital between  different  sectors would be to subsidize the 
production  of  human  capital. 
Within  the  confines  of  the  model,  the  social  optimum  can  be 
achieved  by  subsidizing  the  accumulation  of  A.  Demonstrating  this 
result  rigorously  starting  from  arbitrary initial conditions  forces  the 
analysis to depart  from consideration  of balanced growth paths. Any 
intervention  designed  to  move  an  economy  from  one  balanced 
growth  path to another  must consider  the transition dynamics along 
the way, and an explicit analysis of these dynamics is beyond the scope 
of  this paper.  It is easy, however,  to compare  the growth  rate along 
the balanced  growth path that emerges  from the equilibrium with the 
one  that would  emerge  from  the solution  to a social planning  prob- 
lem.  Because  of  the  symmetry  between  the  different  producer  du- 
rables in this economy,  the  optimal  level  of x(i)  is the  same  for  all i 
between  zero and A. This level is related to K and A by the constraint 
that K  =  qxA. Using  this to express  x in terms of K and A, we can 
therefore  write the social planning  problem  for this economy  as 
max  -C 
1 
eIPtdt, 
O  1  -(o 
subject to 
K  -  a+-1Aa+PHyLPK1-a  -  C, 
A =  6HAA, 
Hy  +  HA  H. 
As  is shown  in  the  Appendix,  the  balanced  growth  solution  to  the 
first-order  necessary conditions  for this problem has a growth rate g* 
that is given  by 
9  Em +  (1  -A)p  (14) 
where  0  =  ot/(ot +  13).  The coefficient  A from equation (12) is equal to 
this coefficient  0  times the markup from the monopoly  sector, 1/(1  - 
cx -  13).  This  accounts  for part of the difference  between  the equilib- 
rium  and  the  socially  optimal  rate of  growth.  However,  there  is an 
additional  effect  because  the  term  in  the  denominator  in  equation 
(14) also replaces  the constant  1 from  equation  (13) with the expres- S98  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
sion  1  -  8.  This  change  reflects  the  effect  of  correcting  for  the 
external  effects  associated  with the production  of new ideas. Both of 
these  changes  in the expression  for the rate of growth-the  substitu- 
tion of 0  for A and the substitution  of  1 -  0  for 1  cause the socially 
optimal  allocation  of human  capital to research to be higher,  and this 
causes  the  socially optimal  rate of  growth  to be higher. 
VII.  Growth,  Trade,  and  Research 
The  final observations  about this model  pertain to its implications for 
growth,  trade, and research.  These  can be seen  most simply by com- 
paring the balanced growth equilibrium  for two identical closed econ- 
omies  that operate  in isolation  with the balanced  growth equilibrium 
that would  obtain if the economies  had always been  fully integrated. 
In isolation, the common  growth rate is given by g from equation (13), 
with H set equal to the amount  of human  capital in each country.  In 
the  second  case,  the  growth  rate  is  found  by  replacing  H  by total 
worldwide  human  capital, 2H.  Both the fraction HA/H  of total world- 
wide  human  capital devoted  to research  and  the  rate of  growth  in- 
crease. 
This  thought  experiment  suggests  why  a  decision  to  engage  in 
trade  may be important  even  for  a country  that has a large  popula- 
tion, such as China or India.  If access to a large number of workers or 
consumers  were all that mattered,  having a large population  would be 
a good  substitute  for  trade with other  nations.  The  model  here  sug- 
gests  that  what  is  important  for  growth  is  integration  not  into  an 
economy  with  a large  number  of  people  but  rather  into  one  with a 
large amount  of human  capital. Many of the details of trade between 
different  economies  of this kind remain  to be worked out,2 but since 
growth  seems  to  be  correlated  with  the  degree  of  integration  into 
worldwide  markets but not closely related  to population  size or den- 
sity, the  results from  this model  seem  promising. 
The  most  direct  test of  this implication  of  the model  would  come 
from  a controlled  experiment  in which  the level  of  research  activity 
was monitored  both before  and after a country  was opened  to trade 
with the rest of the world. Sokoloff  (1988)  reports historical data on a 
natural  experiment  that  comes  close  to  this  test.  He  finds  cross- 
sectional  variation  that  supports  the  model:  counties  in the  United 
States  in  the  early  nineteenth  century  that  had  access  to  navigable 
waterways had  higher  rates of  patenting  than counties  that did not. 
2 Since  the  first draft  of  this  paper  was written,  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1989a, 
1989b) have explored  detailed  models of trade and growth with this kind of underlying 
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More convincingly,  he shows that over time, the introduction  of water 
transportation  (because  of  either  the construction  of  a new canal or 
the dredging  of a river) was followed  by a sharp increase in the rate of 
patenting  in counties  adjacent  to the waterway. 
In subsequent  work, Sokoloff  and  Khan (1989)  examine  the time- 
series  variability in patenting  for  specific individuals.  They  find that 
there was a substantial group of people with broad general knowledge 
who  moved  in and  out  of  research  in response  to aggregate  distur- 
bances  (primarily business  cycles and a trade embargo by the British) 
just  as one  would  expect  if  human  capital that could  be used  to do 
research  had  alternative  uses  in  manufacturing  and  commercial 
trade. They  conclude  that at least in the nineteenth  century, there was 
a fairly elastic short-run  supply of human  capital for use in research. 
Combined  with  the  prior  evidence  that  patenting  activity does  re- 
spond  to changes  in the size of the market, this offers some assurance 
that  the  basic mechanisms  described  in  the  model  are relevant  for 
historical  experience. 
VIII.  Conclusions 
The  model  presented  here  is essentially  the  one-sector  neoclassical 
model  with technological  change,  augmented  to give an endogenous 
explanation  of  the source  of the technological  change.  The  most ro- 
bust welfare conclusion  from the model  is that because research proj- 
ects exchange  current  costs for a stream of benefits in the future,  the 
rate  of  technological  change  is sensitive  to  the  rate of  interest.  Al- 
though  all  the  research  is  embodied  in  capital  goods,  a subsidy  to 
physical capital accumulation  may be a very poor substitute for direct 
subsidies  that  increase  the  incentive  to  undertake  research.  In  the 
absence  of  feasible  policies  that can remove  the divergence  between 
the social and private returns to research,  a second-best  policy would 
be to subsidize  the  accumulation  of  total human  capital. 
The  most  interesting  positive  implication  of  the  model  is that an 
economy  with  a larger  total  stock of  human  capital will experience 
faster growth.  This  finding  suggests  that free international  trade can 
act to speed  up growth.  It also suggests  a way to understand  what it is 
about  developed  economies  in the  twentieth  century  that permitted 
rates of  growth  of  income  per capita that are unprecedented  in hu- 
man history. The  model  also suggests  that low levels of human capital 
may  help  explain  why  growth  is  not  observed  in  underdeveloped 
economies  that are closed  and why a less developed  economy  with a 
very large population  can still benefit from economic  integration  with 
the  rest of  the world. Sioo  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Appendix 
Calculation  of the  Balanced  Growth  Social  Optimum 
To derive  the necessary conditions  for the social optimization  problem  given 
in the  text, construct  the current-valued  Hamiltonian: 
X=  cla+  \[q'P'o+(  -  HA)O'LPK'-O'-  -  C]  +  pi8HAA. 
1 -C 
The  necessary  conditions  follow by maximizing  We  with respect to the control 
variables  C and HA,  and  from  the  equations  for the evolution  of  the  multi- 
pliers X and  Vl: 
A  A-aK'  1=  l  aA' 
The  first-order condition  for maximizing  We  with respect to C gives the usual 
expression  relating  marginal  utility and the  multiplier  X: 
C-  =  X.  (Al) 
If  the  symbol  A  is  used  to  represent  the  term  t+-  -At+P(H 
HA)OLPK'1  - a-  from the Hamiltonian,  the first-order condition  for maximiz- 
ing We  with respect  to HA can be written  as 
A  =  (H  -HA)  11 A.  (A2)  cMX 
Then  with equation  (A2),  the  evolution  equation  for  pi can be simplified  to 
yield 
P -  8(+  OH  HA)  (A3) 
For  a balanced  growth  equilibrium,  it  must  be  the  case  that  a/VL =  A/A 
and  that  C/C  =  A/A. With  equation  (Al),  these  can  be  combined  to  yield 
-  r(A/A)  =  v/p..  Then  combining  the  evolution  equation  for  A,  A/A  = 
8HA,  with equation  (A3) gives an equation  in H,  HA, and the basic parameters 
of  the  model: 
-C8HA  =  P  -  3+  H  HA)  (A4) 
Equation  (14) in the text can be derived  from this equation by solving for HA 
and  using  the  fact that the growth  rate g is given  by g  =  8HA. 
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